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Carol Jacobsen, Kammy Mizga, Lynn D 'Orio"
I. INTRODUCTION
The worldwide crisis of violence against women, from intimate
relationships to interactions with the state, is a human rights issue of
intolerable proportions. According to Amnesty International, 70 percent of
female murder victims are killed by their male partners, globally. In
response, governments have publicly condemned violence against women,
but have failed in substantive ways to show political will to fully address it,
provide financial resources to end it, or meet women's needs for alternative
strategies and support. Since the site of greatest danger for women is in the
home, and the greatest threat is found in their relationships to men,
"Amnesty International points to every country in the world for failing to
protect women in their own homes."2
In the United States, police encounter more cases of domestic violence
each year than all other forms of violence combined. Approximately 85
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1. In March, 2004, Amnesty International launched a global campaign to stop
violence against women. Sara Bennett, Amnesty International, Amnesty International
Launches Global Campaign To Stop Violence Against Women (2004),
http://www.amnesty.ie/content/view/full/ 699.
2. Id.
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percent of the victims of partner violence are female. 3 At least 1,200
women, or one-third of all female murder victims, are murdered by their
male partners each year, while less than 4 percent of all male murder
victims are killed by female partners.4 Most women who kill do so to
defend themselves from men who have repeatedly beaten them.5
Despite the very real dangers that many women live with on a daily
basis, those who defend themselves against batterers are given no special
consideration by the criminal-legal system if they are forced to kill. In fact,
there is evidence that such women often face greater punishment than other
defendants. A study conducted by The Michigan Battered Women's
Clemency Project of homicide convictions and sentences in Oakland
County, Michigan, over a three-year period from 1986 to 1988, revealed
startling levels of discrimination against defendants who were victims of
domestic violence. All of the victims of domestic violence in this study
were women. Results showed that domestic violence victims had higher
conviction rates and longer sentences than all others charged with
homicide, including those with previous violent criminal records. Overall,
a white female defendant with no prior convictions or criminal history who
was convicted by a jury of killing a white person could expect an average
sentence of 10 to 30 years. However, if the woman was a victim of
domestic violence, her predicted sentence increased to life.
II. SELF-DEFENSE LAW
In Michigan, the law allows any person to: (1) take a life to defend her
or his own life; (2) be judged according to how the circumstances appeared
to the person at the time; and (3) be judged according to the person's own
honest and reasonable belief that she or he was in danger of being killed,
seriously injured or forcibly sexually penetrated.6 However, in practice, the
right to self-defense is not granted to women in the same way it is granted
to men.
Feminist scholars have criticized the inadequacy of the self-defense
construct and/or its application to battered women. Cynthia Gillespie notes
that the law of self-defense has changed remarkably little since the Middle
Ages, although the society it serves has changed dramatically.7 She argues
3. CALLIE MARIE RENNiSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/ipv01 .pdf#search=%22intimate%20partner/n20violence%201993-2001.
4. Id.; JAMES ALAN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/intimates.htm.
5. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 10-11 (The Free Press 1987).
6. MICH. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 174.11 (1986); People v. Heflin, 456
N.W.2d 10, 19 (Mich. 1990); People v. Tubbs, 110 N.W. 132, 135-36 (Mich. 1907); MICH.
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.15-7.22 (1989).
7. CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE,
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that self-defense law itself is too narrow and relies on underlying
assumptions that defeat women's self-defense claims for two reasons.
8
First, the law has, over centuries, come to embody the notion of a fair fight
between persons of equal size and strength duking it out, which does not
allow for situations where a woman uses a weapon to offset a man's
overpowering size and strength. 9 Second, our society's attitudes about
women, their proper roles, and the normalization of violence against them,
especially within the home, play an important role in the murder
convictions of women who acted in self-defense. 10 Elizabeth Comack has
proposed replacing the legal term "self-defense" with the more gender-
neutral "self-preservation."1  Changing the language, she argues, would
introduce "the issue of women's structured inequality into the court's frame
of reference. 12
Cynthia Gillespie discusses three areas of self-defense law that unfairly
result in convictions of battered women who kill: (1) the definition of
imminence; (2) the rule requiring retreat; and (3) the requirement of
proportionality or sufficient seriousness. 13  The rule of imminence,
Gillespie argues, is often strictly applied and means the woman is not
entitled to fight back with a weapon until her attacker is actually beating
her severely enough to make it clear that he is going to beat her to death or
nearly so.14 By that time, she would be helpless to fight back, but the law
does not allow for such considerations.' 5 The rule requiring retreat harkens
back to what is termed "the castle doctrine," or the old English right to
defend one's castle, which is difficult to apply to battered women's cases.
16
In fact, Gillespie states, "[T]he large majority of the cases, where it has
been held that one must retreat from one's own home, involve defendants
who are battered women."' 7 The proportionality requirement also defeats
women's right to defend themselves, as juries tend to find "excessive force
in many situations where a woman uses a weapon against an unarmed man,
even when it is hard to imagine what alternative she realistically had.",
18
Dr. Charles Ewing's (1990) data on 100 cases of battered women who
caused the death of their partners showed that "despite generally abundant
evidence that they were severely abused by the men they killed, many if
AND THE LAW 49 (Ohio State University Press 1989).
8. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 8, 51.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Elizabeth Comack, Women Defendants and the "Battered Wife Syndrome": A
Plea for the Sociological Imagination, 11 CROWN COUNSEL'S REV. 5, 10 (1987).
12. Id.
13. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 50.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 39.
17. Id. at 82.
18. Id. at 55.
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not most of these women are convicted because the circumstances
surrounding their homicidal acts do not meet the requirement of current
self-defense law. .".."19 One reason for women's use of available weapons
is that the size difference requires the woman protecting herself to
compensate. Elizabeth Leonard and others argue that since men in
heterosexual relationships are typically taller and stronger than their female
partners, women are merely equalizing the relative strength of men by
using a weapon.20 Therefore, appropriately applied, a woman's use of a
weapon should not constitute "excessive force" and the law should include
an "equalizer principle.",
21
Other scholars, including Meda Chesney-Lind and George Fletcher,
have pointed out that a battered woman defendant is robbed of a fair trial
when a jury is not allowed to give her individual consideration. Fletcher,
who developed the theory of individualized inquiry in criminal law,
advocates "a full consideration of individual differences and capacities"
when determining a defendant's accountability.23 The argument for
individualized treatment reflects a deep tension in criminal law between
individualization and legal rules - a tension that has perpetuated the
24problem of sex discrimination. Male strategies of control and battering
converge with biased structures and institutional practices to make it
difficult, sometimes impossible, for women to escape from abusive
relationships, thus perpetuating and legitimizing violence against them in
the domestic and criminal justice sphere.25 Meda Chesney-Lind notes that
the male model of incarceration emphasizes treating women offenders as
though they were men, particularly when the outcome is punitive, in the
name of equal justice.26 It is the dark side of the parity model of justice:
vengeful equity.27
In 2002, the Michigan Supreme Court revisited the law concerning the
use of deadly force in self-defense in People v. Riddle.2 8 The court ruled
19. Charles P. Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense: A Proposed Justification for
Battered Women Who Kill, 14 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 579, 580 (1990), quoted in
ELIZABETH DERMODY LEONARD, CONVICTED SURVIVORS: THE IMPRISONMENT OF BATTERED
WOMEN WHO KILL 27 (SUNY Press 2002).
20. LEONARD, supra note 19, at 29.
21. Id.
22. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 639 (1980).
23. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 512 (Oxford University Press
ed., 2000) (1978), quoted in Schneider, supra note 22, at 639.
24. Schneider, supra note 22, at 639-40 (applying the theory of individuality to self-
defense in battered women's cases).
25. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 91-97
(Yale University Press 2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN].
26. Meda Chesney-Lind, The Forgotten Offender, 60 CORRECTIONS TODAY 66, 70
(1998).
27. Id.
28. People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 2002).
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that one may use deadly force in self-defense if she or he honestly and
reasonably believes that she or he is in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm and that deadly force is necessary to prevent such death or
great bodily harm.29
The first requirement allows for the person's subjectivity in the honest
belief that death or great bodily harm is imminent. 30  Gillespie has
questioned the "objectively reasonable" expectation, given that the law has
historically relied upon the concept of "the reasonable man," and a
masculine standard cannot be used to measure a woman's behavior in a
battering situation.31 In her study of battered women's cases that are being
reviewed by the governor for clemency in California, Allison Madden
found that in several cases, the full set of circumstances known to the
defendant was not taken into account when determining her fear of
imminent harm. 32 Madden argues that logic and common sense mandate
that a jury should be instructed that it may consider evidence of a history of
battering when deciding whether a woman had a reasonable fear of
imminent harm.
33
The second requirement, that the threat must be imminent, disallows
the use of deadly force if the threat is distant or remote.34 Gillespie argues
for a more flexible interpretation of imminence than the present
interpretation by most courts.35 Instructing a jury that it may consider a
history of battering in its decision about a woman's reasonable fear of
imminent harm would allow a fair consideration of her subjective
experience, intimate knowledge of her assailant, and signs of escalating
violence against her in defending herself. Holly Maguigan also notes that
the definition of "imminence" is critical to the outcome, and that most state
courts are not consistent in their definitions of imminence and
immediacy.36 Madden, in pointing out that the definition of imminence is
nothing more than a judge-made rule of common law that often protects the
batterer, argues that courts should recognize that the policy behind self-
defense is also to protect the life of the person who has a reasonable fear of
death or serious bodily injury.37 A woman who has a history of abuse may
reasonably perceive danger to her life that is not immediate but is
29. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d at 38.
30. Id.
31. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 93-156.
32. Alison M. Madden, Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers:
Finding a Just Forum, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 28-29 (1993).
33. Id.
34. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d at 40.
35. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 185.
36. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 414 n.119 (1991). The Oxford
English Dictionary defines "imminent" as "impending threateningly." OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 685 (2d ed. 1989).
37. Madden, supra note 32, at 32.
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nonetheless imminent.38
The third requirement of Michigan self-defense law is that the
perceived harm must be one of death or great bodily harm. 39 This rule
often rests on the assumption that two adversaries are equal in size, strength
and physical training.40 A battered woman who has tried to defend herself
with only her own strength may well know that her efforts trigger greater
violence against her. As a result, many women use guns, knives or
household items to protect themselves. In many cases, failure to fully
present this instruction has unjustly affected women's trials in Michigan,
including that of Stacy Barker, one of the cases in the present study in
Oakland County.
In People v. Barker, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a
reasonable and honest fear of forced sexual penetration justifies the use of
deadly force in self-defense. 4' The ruling was based on the case of Stacy
Barker, whose trial judge refused to give the proper instructions to the
jury.42 Barker was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to
mandatory life in prison.43 She stabbed a male acquaintance with his own
paring knife as he was assaulting her.4 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld the first-degree murder conviction and determined that the
failure of the trial court to give the instruction to the jury was an error, but a
"harmless error."45 The court's decision was based on the determination
that the defendant used excessive force in stabbing her attacker thirty-two
times. 46  Barker's attacker was a six-foot, two-hundred-pound, white,
Lutheran minister who was entirely mobile; she was a black 20-year-old
aide, working at the retirement center where he resided.47 He attacked her
in his apartment.48 After a prolonged struggle to escape, during which he
tore her clothes, dropped his pants and wrestled her to the floor, Barker
grabbed a paring knife from his counter in self-defense. 49 Only a few years
before, she was gang-raped, and she desperately did not want to be raped
50
again.
38. Madden, supra note 32, at 32.
39. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d at 30.
40. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 8, 51.
41. People v. Barker, 468 N.W.2d 492, 493 (Mich. 1991), habeas corpus relief
granted on other grounds sub nom. Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 1999).
42. Id.
43. Id
44. Yukins, 199 F.3d at 869.
45. Barker, 468 N.W.2d at 493.
46. Id
47. Id.; Interviews with Stacy Barker, in Plymouth, Mich. (Jan. 1990; Sept. 1992);
Videotape: 3 On a Life Sentence (Carol Jacobsen 1998) (on file with author).
48. Barker, 468 N.W.2d at 493.
49. Id; Interviews with Stacy Barker, supra note 47; 3 On a Life Sentence, supra
note 47.
50. Barker, 468 N.W.2d at 493; Interviews with Stacy Barker, supra note 47; 3 On a
Life Sentence, supra note 47.
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The fourth requirement of the Michigan Supreme Court decision in the
Riddle case emphasized "that the touchstone of any claim of self-defense,
as a justification for homicide, is necessity. '' 51 Necessity implies a duty to
retreat before using deadly force in self-defense. Therefore, the known
opportunity for safe retreat is one factor the jury should normally consider
in deciding if the killing was necessary. However, Riddle discusses three
exceptions to the general rule implying a duty to retreat.52 First, one is not
required to retreat from a sudden, violent attack. 3 Second, one is not
required to retreat when one is involved in non-deadly combat that
escalates into a deadly confrontation that occurs outside of her or his own
dwelling.5 4 Third, one is not required to retreat from one's own dwelling
and its attached appurtenances (although this does not extend to the yard).55
Since this duty to retreat does not apply to one's own dwelling, it would
seem that the lingering power of the question "why didn't she leave?"
attests to the failure of courts and other public institutions to make this
legal point widely understood. 6 Such a question also ignores the large
body of evidence showing that women are in the greatest danger when
trying to leave.57
While the burden of proof in Michigan law does not require the
defendant to prove that she or he acted in self-defense, the law does require
that the defendant have a reasonable belief in the necessity to act.
8
Because this requirement is too often misunderstood in court, Allison
Madden argues that a judge should instruct a jury that it may consider the
full set of circumstances known to a battered woman, including the history
of battering, when deciding whether a woman was reasonable to fear
imminent harm and to feel the necessity to act.
59
51. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d at 39.




56. BROWNE, supra note 5, at 113.
57. Id. at 113-22; see also PATRICIA GAGNE, BATTERED WOMEN'S JUSTICE: THE
MOVEMENT FOR CLEMENCY AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 23-29 (Twayne Publishers
1998). In a case in this study, Judge Norman Lippitt, who recognized the error in his
handling of the case too late, stated, "Considering everything I have said, my sympathy and
sympathy for the family, for the victim and considering what I believe is genuine remorse
on your part, I must tell you that the proper option in the situation that you found yourself in
would have been to seek a separation or divorce." Transcript of Jury Trial at vol. 8, 18-19,
People v. Kantzler, No. 87-78545-FC (Mich. 6th. Cir. Ct. 1988). Judge Lippitt later
recognized his mistake and has, since 1993, continued to advocate vigorously for Karen
Kantzler's release. See Letter from Normal L. Lippitt, Judge of the 6th Circuit of the State
of Michigan, to Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of the State of Michigan (Dec. 15, 2003)
(on file with author). However, she remains in prison.
58. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d at 36.
59. Madden, supra note 32, at 28.
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III. BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME
Battered woman's syndrome was first identified by Lenore Walker, a
forensic psychologist, in her 1979 book, The Battered Woman.
60
According to Walker, a battered woman is "a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern
for her rights."61 The battered woman's syndrome refers to characteristics
that purportedly appear in women who have been physically and
psychologically abused by their husbands or partners.62 Walker described a
pattern of cyclical abuse consisting of three recurrent phases: (1) a tension
building stage, characterized by minor abuse; (2) an acute battering stage,
characterized by uncontrollable explosions of brutal violence; and (3) a
loving, respite stage, characterized by the batterer's calm and loving
behavior and pleas for forgiveness. 63 The continued cycle of violence and
contrition is said to result in a state of learned helplessness by the battered
woman.64 An abused woman, living with constant fear and a perceived
inability to escape, eventually comes to believe that her only options are
enduring the abuse or death.65 The concept of "learned helplessness" has
been used to explain why some battered women might not leave an abusive
relationship.66
Walker's theories have been criticized for pathologizing women and
implying that battered women suffer from mental illness.67 The notion of
learned helplessness may also engender stereotypical ideas of a battered
woman, which are then used to exclude those women who perform
competently in other areas of their lives.68 Patricia Gagne notes that to
60. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (Harper & Row 1979).
61. Id. at xv.
62. Id. at 31-35.
63. Id. at 56-70.
64. Id. at 45-51.
65. Id
66. Sharon Allard, Rethinking the Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 191, 192 (1991); see also WALKER, supra note 60, at
16. Walker's early research on battered women was later expanded to include the
psychological reactions to long-term abuse exhibited by hostages, prisoners of war, and
victims of terrorism. One of these, the "Stockholm Syndrome," was first formulated by
psychologists following the 1973 bank robbery in Stockholm in which four people who
were held in a bank vault for four days became attached to their captors. Characteristic of
symptoms for the syndrome include identification by the captives with their captors as a
defense or survival mechanism, the fear that the captives may also be hurt by rescuers, and
empathy for the captors as human beings with problems, grievances, and a point of view.
The theory explains that captives who feel in danger and who do not believe they can escape
a situation unharmed will, as a means of survival, begin thinking in ways that seem
incompatible with their situation, but which, when more closely examined, are actually
emotionally and physically safer for them, because they are not antagonizing their captors.
67. See Allard, supra note 66, at 206.
68. Madden, supra note 32, at 48-49; SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 25,
at 120; GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 180.
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fully comprehend battered woman syndrome, and why women stay in
relationships with abusers, we must examine gender inequality in our
society.69  In fact, battered women use many strategies for their own
survival, from placating their abusers to fighting back, and from efforts to
stop the abuse and calling the police to leaving. 70 However, the lack of
support from law enforcement, social services, and the medical
establishment tend to converge with society's predisposition to blame
battered women for their own abuse.71
Walker's theory has also been challenged by feminists, such as Sharon
Allard, on the grounds that it cannot fairly apply to non-white women.
72
Allard points to pervasive stereotypes, reinforced by the media, that black
women are domineering, sexually aggressive, assertive, hostile, immoral,
and physically stronger than white women.73 These characteristics make it
difficult for judges and juries to attribute black women's acts of self-
defense to the "learned helplessness" associated with battered woman's
syndrome.74
It was not until 1992, in People v. Wilson, that the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome would
be allowed at trial. 75 However, this and similar laws in other states do not
constitute a "defense" at trial.76 What has been misunderstood as "battered
woman's defense" is really an expansion of self-defense law to permit
expert testimony and evidence of abuse at trial. 7 In People v. Wilson, the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that in a homicide trial where self-defense
is claimed by a victim of battering, an expert may testify concerning "the
battered spouse syndrome," the symptoms that manifest it, and whether
behavior of the defendant is characteristic of "battered spouse" victims
generally.78 It is the defense attorney's job to show how this evidence fits
into a claim of self-defense and to argue the reasonableness of the woman's
actions.79
However, an astonishing number of battered women receive
ineffective, even incompetent, legal counsel who are unprepared to link
abuse to defense theories.8 ° Unlike many states where expert testimony
69. GAGNE, supra note 57, at 18.
70. See SCHNEIDER, BATrERED WOMEN, supra note 25, at 120.
71. Id. at 12; GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 11-12; see generally Sarah M. Buel, Fifty
Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28 COLO. LAW. 19 (1999).
72. Allard, supra note 66, at 200-06.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
76. Gail Rodwan & Jeanice Dagher-Margosian, Michigan Recognizes Battered
Spouse Syndrome, 72 MICH. BAR J. 82, 82 (1993).
77. Id. at 80, 114.
78. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d at 825.
79. See id.
80. Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants:
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and evidence of battering are permitted, experts testifying in Michigan are
precluded from giving an opinion about whether a particular defendant was
suffering from battered woman's syndrome. 81 Lenore Walker, who
testified for the defense in the trial of Nancy Seaman, noted that she was
surprised by this restriction in Michigan law, which she had not
encountered in the hundreds of trials in which she had testified in other
states.82 In 2004, Nancy Seaman was convicted in Oakland County Circuit
Court of first-degree murder in the death of her abusive husband.83 On the
day the verdict was read, one juror stated, "She was not a meek, howling
woman waiting for the next beating., 84 And at sentencing, the trial judge
said that although he believed she was an abused wife, she could use that
experience to help other women while she lives out her life in prison: "The
lesson you have to teach is to get help and to get out."85
In a 1991 survey of 223 appellate cases in homicide convictions of
battered women in California, Holly Maguigan argued that the law of self-
defense itself is adequate to support battered women defendants, but the
major obstacle to due process is that judges, vested with the power to make
credibility determinations on the sufficiency of defense evidence, unjustly
apply the law and essentially deny battered women fair trials. 86 Judges
implement their bias through the exclusion of evidence, the denial of self-
defense instructions, and/or the repudiation of instructions to the jury on
the relevance of a battered woman's evidence.87 Sue Osthoff, cofounder
and executive director of the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of
Battered Women, contends that judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
jurors, all bring myths and stereotypes about battered women to any trial
that are used to exclude individual women. 88 The use of "syndrome"
terminology, she states, often shifts the focus away from "Did she act in
self-defense?" to "Does she truly have 'battered woman's syndrome?' ' 89
Maguigan's survey found that the rules outlining when a woman is
entitled to a self-defense instruction are "the single most important
A Normative Construct, 26 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 217, 218 (2003).
81. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d at 825.
82. Expert: Teacher Who Killed Husband Was 'Battered Woman, 'LOCAL 4, Dec. 10,
2004, http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/3988956/detail.html.
83. Teacher Found Guilty of Hacking Husband to Death, LOCAL 4, Dec. 14, 2004,
http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/3996717/detail.html.
84. Seaman Jury Rejects Battered Wife Claim, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 15, 2004,
at IA.
85. Woman is Defiant as She's Sentenced to Life, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 25,
2005.
86. Maguigan, supra note 36, at 383, 440.
87. Id. at 439-40.
88. NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEF. OF BATTERED WOMEN, ADDRESSING A
NATIONAL ISSUE: JUSTICE FOR WOMEN WHO FIGHT BACK: SOME THOUGHTS AND QUESTIONS
3(1999).
89. Id.
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determinant of a defendant's ability to get an instruction on self-defense." 90
In many cases, battered women were not able to assert self-defense at all
because of the trial courts' refusals to apply battered women's use of
deadly force as reasonable under established legal definitions.9' Maguigan
also exposes the incorrect assumption that most women kill when the
abuser is asleep or during a lull in the violence. Instead, she found that
most kill in confrontational situations: 75 percent involved confrontations;
20 percent were non-confrontational cases; 8 percent consisted of sleeping-
man cases; and 8 percent of cases involved the defendant as aggressor
during a lull in the violence; the remaining 5 percent did not discuss the
facts.92 Maguigan's position is that any evidence coming from any source
should satisfy the requirement for a full instruction on self-defense, and
that includes instructing the jury on the relevance of that evidence. 93
In her critique of the inadequacy of the self-defense construct and/or its
application to battered women, Gillespie points to the high rate of
convictions in battered women's cases.94 She argues that this is often the
result in cases where prosecutors have trotted out every "myth and
stereotype and misconception about women that could conceivably inflame
a jury against the defendant," knowing that they could get juries to convict
women who don't fit the stereotype.95 Allison Madden notes that
prosecutors often initiate the inequity at the time they file charges since that
decision represents a conclusion that a woman who killed her batterer acted
with intent and may ignore evidence favoring a reduced sentence or a
finding of self-defense. 96  Mary Ann Dutton, a forensic psychologist,
argues that neither "battered woman's syndrome" nor post traumatic stress
disorder, a psychological category that encompasses battered woman's
syndrome, adequately covers the breadth of knowledge developed over the
past several decades about battering and its effects on women.97 Dutton
further argues that these terms tend to exclude women who do not seem to
suffer from these "disorders," but did act in self-defense.98  Elizabeth
Schneider summarizes the problem of battered woman's syndrome as
90. Maguigan, supra note 36, at 439.
91. Id. at 436-37.
92. Id. at 382, 397; CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE As LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 42 (Lexington Books 1987);
BROWNE, supra note 5, at 163-64.
93. Maguigan, supra note 36, at 383, 439-42.
94. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at xi.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Madden, supra note 32, at 34-35.
97. Mary Ann Dutton, The Validity of 'Battered Woman Syndrome' in Criminal
Cases Involving Battered Women 17-19 (Malcolm Gordon ed.), in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL




relying on stereotypes of femininity that harm women who are too
assertive, aggressive, or insufficiently remorseful, and racial stereotypes
that produce special hurdles for women of color, thus rendering most
women unable to fit the definition. 99 She argues further that it is important
to challenge the concept of reasonableness due to continuing public
resistance to the concept of a woman's reasonableness. 100  In a
comprehensive analysis of the failure of the American criminal-legal
profession with regard to cases involving battered women defendants,
Sarah M. Buel offers a framework for lawyers and judges handling these
cases in the future.'
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IV. OAKLAND COUNTY STUDY
The present study of homicide convictions and sentences in Oakland
County, Michigan cover a three-year period from 1986 to 1988, inclusive.
The study was conducted by the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency
Project to determine whether, and if so, how, gender bias in Michigan
courts in one urban county has affected the outcome of battered women's
trials. 0 2 Only homicide cases that occurred and were disposed of within
99. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 25, at 82-83.
100. Id.
101. See generally, Buel, supra note 80.
102. The Michigan Battered Women's Clemency Project was founded in 1991 by
activist and former prisoner Susan Fair. Coordinators of the Project estimate that, of the
approximately 340 women currently serving time in Michigan prisons for Murder I, II, and
felony murder, perhaps half may be battered women who acted in self-defense. By 2004,
the Project had reviewed well over 100 cases, and directly represented 27 battered women,
most of whose cases were oldest and had life or long-term sentences, and had worked with
dozens more in various ways, including challenging the four point chaining in segregation
and other forms of torture practiced by the Michigan Department of Corrections in the
women's prisons. In the past decade, Michigan's women's prisons have been the subject of
investigations by Amnesty International USA, Human Rights Watch, the U.S. Justice
Department, and other organizations because of the rampant sexual assaults and harassment
by male guards, the medical neglect, and other abuses of female inmates. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RIGHTS FOR ALL: "NOT PART OF MY
SENTENCE" VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1999); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, NOWHERE TO HIDE: RETALIATION AGAINST WOMEN IN MICHIGAN STATE
PRISONS (1998). Twenty-six of the women in the Project were directly represented through
clemency petitions to the governor, and others through motions and/or appeals in court
(several through both petitions and court), and still others through support for parole,
demands for human rights, and other efforts. The waiting list continues to grow as more
women self-identify. Most of the petitions for clemency were rewritten and resubmitted one
or more times. All but one woman had served over ten years and some over twenty, two
over thirty. All petitions submitted to Governor Engler (Michigan Governor from 1990-
2002) were denied with no reason given. Twenty petitions submitted to Governor
Granholm in 2003 were denied all at once in 2006 with letters that read, "This office is not
persuaded that the arguments presented in your application are compelling enough to
overcome the great weight of your [plea/conviction] .... " Between 1998 and 1999, the
Project succeeded in freeing two women from life sentences through Motions for Relief
from Judgment. Each woman had served approximately twenty years. Three more women
were released on parole whose petitions had been filed by the Clemency Project. Motions
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the three-year period were studied. This period was selected because it
included at least one of the cases currently represented by the Clemency
Project.
Oakland County, located in southeast Michigan and adjacent on the
north to Detroit, is one of the largest counties in the state. Its population in
2000 was 1.1 million (the state population was just under 10 million), 10
percent of whom had moved to Oakland County in the past decade.10 3
Racially, Oakland County differs from Detroit and the rest of Michigan,
with 82.8 percent of its population white (compared to 80.2 percent for the
state, and 12.3 percent for Detroit) and 10 percent black (compared to 14.2
percent for the state, and 81.6 percent for Detroit). 10 4  This racial
composition hints at another difference between Oakland and Detroit, as
well as with the rest of the state. While the median household income in
Oakland County in 1989 was $43,407, neighboring Wayne County, within
which Detroit lies, had a median household income of only $27,997.105
for Relief from Judgment filed in two more cases were denied in 2003. Over the past
decade, two women died whose petitions had been filed by the Clemency Project, one
woman on the waiting list committed suicide, and several on the waiting list were paroled
after serving lengthy sentences. For the first person stories and social critiques by some of
the women in the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency Project, see Videotape: From One
Prison... (Carol Jacobsen 1994) (on file with author); see also Videotape: Clemency (Carol
Jacobsen 1997) (on file with author); see also Videotape: Segregation Unit (Carol Jacobsen
2000) (on file with author); see also Michigan Battered Women's Clemency Project,
Women's Stories, http://www.umich.edu/-clemency (last visited October 12, 2006).




sl=050&_submenuld=factsheet l&dsname=ACS_2005_SAFF (last visited Sept. 27,
2006);
104. Id.; U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: Detroit City, Michigan, http://factfinder.
census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=ChangeGeoContext&geo id= 16000US2622000&_g
eoContext=01OOOUS7C04000US26%7C05000US26125& street=& county=detroit& cit
yTown=detroit&_state=04000US26& zip=& lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelec
t&_useEV=&pctxt-=fph&pgsl=010&_submenuld=factsheet 1&ds name=DEC 2000_SAFF






105. U.S. Census Bureau, Median Household Income by County: 1969, 1979, 1989
(2004), http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/county/countyl.html. Economic infor-
mation is relevant although the police records do not have any information about the
defendant's income levels. As an alternative proxy, where available, we collected
information about whether the defendant used a court appointed public defender or retained
a private attorney. The results do not change whether or not we include this variable.
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A. METHODOLOGY
There were 18,242 felony cases in Oakland County during the years
1986, 1987, and 1988. However, the Oakland County Circuit Court's
coding system did not differentiate homicides from other felonies. The
Michigan State Police provided documentation for a total of 129 homicides
for those three years, but there was no compilation of homicides by
defendant or victim name, nor was any other crime reporting compilation
required under state or federal law.' 
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Since neither the Oakland County Clerk's Office, the Prosecutor's
office, the Sheriffs Department, nor the Michigan State Police could
provide a list of the names of all 129 defendants in the homicide cases, a
list of the 57 law enforcement jurisdictions within Oakland County was
obtained from the local battered women's shelter. Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests were made to each of the 57 law enforcement
jurisdictions, requesting the incident reports of all homicides, the full
names of suspects, and the number of homicides occurring within the
jurisdiction for the respective years. This method was highly successful as
all of the 129 homicide cases were accounted for.
The police reports were obtained to compile demographic information,
including the race, sex, and age of each defendant and victim. Information
as to whether there was a relationship between the defendant and the victim
and the nature of that relationship were also collected. File numbers were
obtained by using the name of the suspect or defendant. Original court
files were pulled for each homicide in order to obtain sentencing and
conviction information and to fill in any missing relationship or
demographic information. Additionally, more specific FOIA requests were
made to individual law enforcement jurisdictions to obtain any data that
could not be found from the original FOIA requests, police reports, or court
files. FOIA requests were also sent to the Oakland County Probation
Office to obtain sentencing guidelines for those that were not present in the
court file.
Cases of manslaughter involving motor vehicles or the negligent use of
motor vehicles were eliminated from the study. After the cases were
eliminated, 82 cases remained: 14 with female defendants and 68 with male
defendants. The data set was then subjected to multivariate tests, including
106. Because Oakland County Circuit Court records from the relevant years do not
distinguish homicide cases from all other felony cases (approximately 18,000 total for those
years), it was necessary to make 42 individual FOIA requests, from each law enforcement
jurisdiction, for police reports for all homicides within their jurisdiction for the years 1987,
1987, 1988. A list of these jurisdictions was obtained through assistance from the Oakland
County battered women's shelter. Police reports gave information, such as name and race,
that was not always included in the court file. This made it possible to get the case number
from circuit court computers if charges were filed, and pull the court file for conviction and
sentencing information.
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controlling for race, sex, age, prior convictions, and whether the defendant
had a private attorney (an imperfect indicator of economic status, but the
only data available). Information gathered for statistical comparison
included: sex, age, race, and socioeconomic status of both the defendant
and victim; whether there was a prior relationship between the parties,
whether it was intimate, and whether it involved domestic violence;
whether the defendant had a prior criminal record, a summary of the
offense, what the defendant was charged with, whether the charges were
amended, case disposition, including whether there was a conviction, what
the conviction was, whether there was acquittal or plea taken, whether it




The sample included 82 homicide cases that occurred and were
disposed of in Oakland County during the years 1986, 1987, and 1988.
Among the defendants, 50 percent were non-white and 17 percent were
women. Among the 64.2 percent of defendants who were convicted, 41
percent were convicted of first-degree murder and 17 percent of those
convicted had sentences that exceeded the guidelines. All of the
defendants who were victims of domestic violence were women, and 64.29




The results show that 71.43 percent of women were convicted, while
only 62.69 percent of men were convicted. Among the women who were
black, 80 percent were convicted, compared to only 61.97 percent for the
rest of the sample. If the homicide victim was white, 78.95 percent of
those defendants were convicted as opposed to only 51.16 percent
otherwise. If there were intimate relations between defendant and victim,
83.33 percent were convicted compared to 60.87 percent otherwise. If the
defendant was a victim of domestic violence, 77.78 percent were convicted,
compared to only 62.50 percent otherwise. In cases where the defendant
killed her batterer, the conviction rate was 71.43 percent compared to 63.51
percent in other cases.109 In multivariate tests, assuming the defendant was
a white female with no prior convictions accused of killing a white person,
and given a jury trial, if there were intimate relations between the
defendant and victim, the probability of conviction increases from 83.24
107. The methodology was devised and the data was collected by Kammy Mizga,
Coordinating Attorney with the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency Project. Irfan
Norruddin performed the statistical analysis from the data.
108. See fig. 1.
109. See fig. 2.
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percent to 96.7 percent. °10 If the defendant was a victim of domestic
violence (all victims of domestic violence were women), the probability of
conviction increases from 78.52 percent to 97.68 percent."' Judges in the
study were harsher on defendants than juries. Bench trials were more
likely to result in first-degree murder convictions (61.54 percent) than jury
trials (38.24 percent).
Results of the study support the conclusion of the 1989 Michigan
Supreme Court Task Force Report on Gender Issues in the Courts:
Women defendants in victim-precipitated homicides may be
treated unfairly by the criminal justice system due to gender-based
attitudes and a lack of understanding of the effects of prolonged
abuse. Primarily, they may be blamed for not leaving their home
or the relationship before the killing occurred. ... The past violent
acts and reputation for cruelty and violence of the decedent, and
the defendant having no duty to retreat from her own home in the
face of an attack, are legal issues which are not consistently raised,
developed, or admitted in these cases. In some cases, the proper
jury instructions as to these legal rules may not be given or
requested. 112
D. ON SENTENCING
In multivariate tests"13 for a white female defendant with no prior
convictions found guilty by a jury of killing a white person, the predicted
sentence, if there was no domestic violence, was 10 to 30 years. However,
if the defendant was a victim of domestic violence, the predicted sentence
increased to life. 114 Because the conviction rate was higher for victims of
domestic violence, all of whom were women, the average sentences were
longer for them than for all others, including batterers and men with
criminal histories.
110. These results are within an 88 percent confidence interval.
111. See fig. 3. These results are within an 84 percent confidence interval.
112. MICH. SUP. CT., FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE
ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS 39 (1989).
113. Using an ordered probit analysis with a four-category dependent variable
(Sentence 1). Results are within a 90 percent confidence interval.
114. See fig. 4; Citizens Alliance of Prisons and Public Spending, Sentencing and
Parole: The Michigan System, http://www.capps-mi.org/sentencing%20and%20parole.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006). Mandatory life means a life sentence without possibility of
parole, and is the mandatory sentence for conviction of Murder I. A life sentence with a
possibility of parole, or a term of years may be given for a conviction of Murder II.
However, the proportion of paroles granted in Michigan declined from 68 percent in 1990 to
48 percent in 2002 overall, and for women the numbers of paroles granted have been very
few. The reality is that any life sentence may mean just that.
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V. CASE SUMMARIES
Among the 82 cases in the study, 68 of the defendants were male while
14 were female, and 49 of the victims were male while 18 were female.
The following are summaries of some of these cases. 115 The summaries
give more detail about women who died at the hands of batterers or who
were convicted despite defending themselves against a batterer or rapist. It
is also instructive to compare the contexts and available details of cases
involving women in contrast to those involving men.
A. ARE MEN WHO KILL BATTERERS HEROES?
There were two cases in the sample in which men intervened on behalf
of battered women and actually killed the women's abusers. One man was
acquitted and one received 7 to 25 years, far less than the life sentence that
women who killed batterers themselves could expect.
Floyd Anthony Frick, 30, was acquitted of second-degree murder and
felony firearm charges after he shot and killed his girlfriend's unarmed ex-
husband as he walked towards Frick. Both men were white. Despite a
permanent injunction against him, Michael Stokes, 37, showed up at the
defendant's home, where Stokes' ex-wife also resided. Stokes threatened
and assaulted his ex-wife in the driveway. Frick did not call police or
retreat with his girlfriend into their home. Instead, Frick walked into the
house and got a shotgun. Frick came out of the house and told Stokes to
leave. Stokes refused to leave, approached Frick, and allegedly grabbed for
the gun. The gun "went off," killing Stokes. At a jury trial, Frick's motion
for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecutor's case was granted, and
he was acquitted.
Glenn William Johnson, 46, was having drinks with a woman at a bar.
The woman's ex-husband, 47, was stalking her. He followed the couple
and threatened to kill Johnson. Instead, the defendant killed the ex-
husband and claimed self-defense. Both men were white. The defendant
was charged with open murder and was found guilty of second-degree
murder at a bench trial. He was sentenced to 7 to 25 years; he served nine.
Since there were only two cases in this category, it is not possible to
draw a statistically relevant comparison between the categories of women
who kill their batterers and men who kill the women's batterers. However,
it is noteworthy that even though victims of domestic violence are far more
likely to be convicted and sentenced to life than other homicide defendants,
in the two cases where men killed batterers on behalf of women, one was
acquitted and the other received a relatively low sentence. This suggests an
115. The purpose of including these summaries is to give the reader an idea of what
the cases actually look like. Summaries of all the cases are not included. Only those cases
that represent certain categories, or show particular points that the numbers alone could not
represent are discussed.
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acceptance of the male right to defend himself and others, and the social
expectation that a man should protect a woman.
B. WOMEN WHO KILL TO PROTECT A CHILD
Edna Hollis, 39, shot her husband, Mark Hollis, while he was in bed.
He had sexually abused her daughter. She was charged with first-degree
murder; a jury convicted her of second-degree murder and sentenced her to
15 to 40 years. Both the defendant and the victim were black.
The sentence in this case, involving a woman who killed in defense of
her child, was longer than both of the two cases where men killed to protect
women. However, the sentence is less than the average for women who
killed in self-defense, illustrating how society offers more sympathy when
a woman is protecting her child than when she is protecting herself.
C. BATTERERS WHO KILLED WIVES
There were six batterers who killed in this study; two cases are
summarized here. Two of the six defendants were men who killed their
wives or girlfriends over another man, two committed double murders, and
two killed their victim and then killed themselves. The average actual time
served by batterers who killed their female partners, not including the
double murderers and the one who died in prison, was less than 4 years.
Alvie R. Randall, 56, killed his wife, Bobbie, in a "domestic dispute."
Both were black. He had a prior criminal record. He was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter in a bench trial and sentenced to 10 to 15 years.
He served less than two years.
John Curran strangled his wife, Adelaide. Both were white and in their
twenties. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 6
to 15 years. He served nine years.
D. WIVES WHO KILLED THEIR BATTERERS
In two cases where women killed their long-term batterers, both acted
in self-defense during face-to-face struggles for their lives. One received a
life sentence for a second-degree murder conviction, and the other was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 5 to 15 years, which
was within the sentencing guidelines for the conviction. The average of
these two sentences is far longer than the average for batterers who killed
their wives. Like the other two women in the study who claimed self-
defense, these women also served more time than men who claimed self-
defense,
Karen Kantzler, 36, whose case is examined in detail later, killed her
violent, abusive husband in a struggle over a gun. Both were white. He
was a medical doctor who beat her, broke her ribs, tried to drown her, held
guns to her head, repeatedly degraded her, and threatened her life. He had
been sued twice by others for assault. She was convicted of second-degree
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murder by a jury and sentenced to life. She remains in prison.
Yvette Simone Powell, 20, stabbed and killed her husband, James
Keenan Powell, during a fight. Both were black. He choked and kicked
her, and pulled her by the hair. She got loose and grabbed a knife and ran
to the bedroom. He was in the bathroom with the door locked. When he
opened the door, she stuck the knife in and did not realize he had been
stabbed until he yelled and told her to drive him to the hospital. She had
multiple bruises. Police found many holes punched in the drywall of the
house. She was charged with open murder and a jury convicted her of
voluntary manslaughter. She was sentenced to 5 to 15 years. She served
six years.
E. MEN WHO KILLED IN SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense laws served male defendants much better than female
defendants in the study. Women served more than twice as much time as
men in this category. In these cases, the defendants and victims were
friends or acquaintances.
Vincent Smith, 39, was high on cocaine and alcohol at the house of his
friend, Keith Roderick Alford. Alford ordered Smith to leave, but Smith
refused and began beating Alford. Alford claimed self-defense, and
claimed he had no duty to retreat in his own house. Alford shot Smith at
close range. Alford was acquitted in a jury trial.
Mitchell Ambris, 58, killed Richard Stephen Pearce, 37, in a
confrontation regarding a debt. The victim aggressed, and Ambris claimed
he acted in self-defense. The defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. He died in
prison after six years.
David Howard Parker, 25, was acquitted of open murder and two
counts of possession of a firearm (felony firearm) in the commission of a
felony. The case involved a fight in a parking lot over who was going to
give a woman a ride home from a bar. After firing shots in the air to break
up a fight between the victim and the defendant's friend, the defendant shot
and killed the unarmed victim as he and his friends approached the
defendant. Both the defendant and victim were white. A jury found the
defendant not guilty on all counts.
F. WOMEN WHO KILLED IN SELF-DEFENSE
Juries convicted two women who killed their rapists in self-defense in
this study, and judges gave them long sentences.
Stacy Barker, whose case was summarized earlier, was convicted by a
jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. She
remains in prison. Although her case changed Michigan law after her trial
(if requested by the defense, a judge is now required to give instructions to
a jury that a woman has a lawful right to use deadly force to prevent a
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sexual assault), the new law did not affect Stacy Barker's case.' 16
Maha Kouza was a 23-year-old immigrant from Iraq. She lived with
her mother and worked as a cashier in a grocery store owned by Hamal
Dawoud Kouza, her 43-year-old cousin. She did not have a high school
education. Hamal preyed upon her and forced her into sexual relations
against her will. Hamal threatened her with death and threatened to reveal
the secret to family members if she did not perform, or even if she tried to
get married. He would not allow her to have any boyfriends. Police found
Hamal's naked body in front of the television and sperm was recovered
from the scene. Hamal died from a gunshot wound. Maha was convicted
by a jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to 9 to 30 years. She
served 12 years.
G. MEN WHO KILLED MEN
While women rarely kill other women (none were included in this
study), the men who killed other men in the sample were given lighter
sentences, even in clear cases of premeditation, than the women in the
study. None of the men who killed other men were convicted of first-
degree murder, which carries a mandatory life sentence; nor were any
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Sentences of a term of
years, even if lengthy, are preferable to a life sentence, with or without the
possibility of parole. Several of these cases are listed here.
Barry Leigh Whittaker, Jr., 18, slapped a woman and Ronald Terry
Woodal, 24, intervened on the woman's behalf. Whittaker stabbed and
killed Woodal. Whittaker and Woodal were both black. Whittaker was
charged as a habitual offender with open murder, to which he pled guilty.
He received 7 to 15 years and was sentenced below the sentencing
guidelines. He served nine years, re-offended in 2002, and returned to
prison on a sentence of 4 to 15 years for assault with a dangerous weapon.
John Edward Benton stabbed and killed his victim, who lived in the
same rooming house, after an altercation over a book of matches. Benton
was charged with open murder as a second-time habitual offender and pled
guilty to manslaughter. He was sentenced to 3 to 15 years and served five.
Both men were black.
Michael West Eighmy, an 18-year-old white male, had a violent temper
and was violent with his girlfriend. During a drunken rampage, he shot and
killed his best friend, a white male, with a scope-equipped rifle. Eighmy
was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and was sentenced to 40
years. He served three years.
Robert Triplett was 20 years old when he had an altercation with
Michael Payne, 16. After the altercation, Triplett returned, sought Payne
116. Barker, 468 N.W.2d at 85. Stacy Barker was ultimately granted a new trial
through her federal appeal. On December 5, 2001, she pled guilty to Murder II and was
sentenced to 21 to 70 years. She remains in prison.
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out, and shot him. He was charged with open murder, convicted by a jury
of second-degree murder, and sentenced to 15 to 30 years. Both men were
black. He served 14 years.
H. MEN KILLING WOMEN RANDOMLY
Men who killed women randomly were sentenced more severely than
those who killed female partners in the sample. For example, Tony Dale
Marsh, a white, self-employed apprentice bricklayer with an extensive
criminal record, raped, sodomized, and murdered Pamela Lamoreaux,
leaving her naked body on the beach. Marsh apparently had seen
Lamoreaux at a local bar. She was an upper-middle-class, white college
student. In a highly publicized trial, Marsh was convicted of first-degree
felony murder and sentenced to mandatory life. He remains in prison.
I. WOMEN CONVICTED FOR MURDER COMMITTED BY A BATTERER
In one case, Joe Bazzetta, a violent abuser, strangled his stepmother.
His wife, Michelle, was not involved in the attack, but he forced her to help
him clean up the crime, threatening to kill her if she did not do as she was
told. All parties were white. A jury convicted Michelle of second-degree
murder, and she was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. An
expert on domestic violence wrote a lengthy psychological report on
Michelle Bazzetta in support of an unsuccessful appeal. Joe Bazzetta was
found guilty of murder, but was found to be mentally ill. He received life
with the possibility of parole.
J. EXCEPTIONS
Even though most women who kill do so in self-defense, and are
convicted and serve long sentences, there are exceptions. In the sample,
one female victim of domestic violence was acquitted, two battered women
were sentenced within the state sentencing guidelines of their convictions
to probation, one woman died before trial, and one woman killed her child
and herself. All parties were black.
Mary Louveis Terry was charged with open murder and felony firearm
for the shooting death of her abusive husband. She claimed self-defense.
The deceased had previously beaten her and shot her when she was
pregnant. In the incident at issue, the deceased threatened to kill the
defendant, then handed her the gun and challenged her to use it. He then
hit her in the face and came at her with a knife. She shot him. She was
charged with open murder and felony firearm. A jury found that she was
not guilty.
Diana Whitfield shot her abusive husband in the back. She claimed
self-defense. Whitfield's husband was bending over to pick up a gun to use
against her. She had suffered continuous beatings all day. She was
charged with and pled guilty to manslaughter. She was sentenced within
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the guidelines to five years probation.
Marshall Hiawatha Jones killed her abusive boyfriend, Peter Narciese,
III. On the night of the offense, Narciese, in a drunken rage, threatened to
kill, hit, and throw things at Jones. Jones was trying to get out of the
house. She grabbed the gun to protect herself and shot her boyfriend in the
chest. She was charged with open murder and convicted of manslaughter
in a bench trial. She was sentenced to two years probation.
Only one victim of domestic violence had the charges against her
dropped. They were dropped because she died of cancer. Ruth Norman
was terminally ill with metastatic carcinoma of the stomach. Her abusive
husband tried to pull out her catheter and she defended herself by stabbing
him. He died two months later. She was charged with open murder but
died before she went to trial.
The only woman who killed her child also killed herself with a massive
drug overdose.
Cases involving the deaths of both the defendant and victim (two men
who killed their female partners and then themselves, and the woman who
killed her child and then herself) were not included in the study because
there was no trial.
K. DISCUSSION
This study of the 82 homicide cases in Oakland County in 1986, 1987,
and 1988, show that women defendants in these cases were convicted at a
much higher rate than men (71.43 percent of women; 62.69 percent of
men). Black women were convicted at an even higher rate than all others
(80 percent of black women; 61.97 percent of all others), and women who
were victims of domestic violence were also convicted at a higher rate
(77.78 percent were convicted, compared to only 62.50 percent of all
others).
The most startling result in the study is the discrimination in sentencing
against victims of domestic violence, resulting, in part, because of their
higher conviction rate. Overall, a white female defendant with no prior
convictions convicted by a jury of killing a white person could expect an
average sentence of 10 to 30 years. However, if that woman was a victim
of domestic violence, her predicted sentence increased to life.
One would expect any difference in the conviction rates and sentencing
to be insignificant because of the relatively small sample size, the high
profile nature of homicide cases, the higher standard of proof required to
convict in criminal cases, and the relative inflexibility in evidence and
sentencing in homicide cases. However, the data shows that an important
factor in determining whether a defendant was convicted of homicide was
whether she or he was a victim of domestic violence.
Results of this study show unequivocally that victims of domestic
violence in Oakland County during the three-year period under study
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received higher conviction rates and longer sentences than all others
charged with homicide, including those with previous violent criminal
records. These findings correlate to Dr. Elizabeth Leonard's study of 42
women who killed their batterers in California where conviction rates were
discovered to be higher and prison sentences longer than for other homicide
defendants." 17
VI. FAIR USE OF CLEMENCY FOR BATTERED WOMEN'S
JUSTICE
Clemency is a power vested in every sovereign in the world and in the
governors of every state in the United States. 1 8 Types of clemency include
amnesty, pardon, commutation, and reprieve. 19 Granting clemency for
battered women who killed abusers in self-defense is a legitimate use of a
governor's power since it provides redress in cases where the defendants
have been unjustly prosecuted, convicted, and/or sentenced. 120 Governors
who exercise this power are not bound by the same rigid rules of evidence
and procedure that govern the courts. In cases where inequities have
resulted from gender, race, or sexual bias, such as in the case of battered
women defendants, clemency is a necessary remedy to the denial of their
equal rights to trial.' 2' Daniel Kobil, who has written extensively about the
power of clemency, notes, "the clemency power, like talking, cannot be
used judiciously by governors who do not 'keep in practice. ' '"1 22 Despite
the politically explosive nature of the clemency power, it is an integral part
of our system of justice, and hence governors should exercise the power in
a fair and principled manner throughout their tenure in office. 123  Yet,
owing to the potential repercussions for granting clemency, the temptation
has been, and will continue to be, for governors to use the power
infrequently, and in all likelihood, injudiciously. 12 4 It is important that the
clemency power be exercised in an equitable, fair and expansive manner.
117. LEONARD, supra note 19, at 68-69.
118. Madden, supra note 32, at 51-52.
119. Amnesty is given in cases involving political prisoners or groups; a pardon sets
aside or lessens a sentence, forgiving or altering consequences; commutation changes or
reduces a sentence; and reprieve postpones an execution. See generally BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 83, 1137, 274, 1305 (7th ed. 1999).
120. SARA GERAGHTY, CLEMENCY FOR BATTERED WOMEN IN MICHIGAN: A MANUAL
FOR ATTORNEYS, LAW STUDENTS AND SOCIAL WORKERS 12-15 (ACLU Michigan Battered
Women's Clemency Project 1998).
121. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 25, at 145; Madden, supra note 32,
at 1-2.
122. Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 655, 699 (1993).
123. Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L.
REv. 219,239, 241 (2003).
124. Kobil, supra note 122, at 699.
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As public understanding of issues such as domestic violence and
discrimination evolve, clemency provides an indispensable remedy to
secure justice for battered women who are serving sentences for crimes
committed in an era when police were reluctant to arrest batterers, shelters
were rare or nonexistent, and society widely blamed battered women for
not leaving.
25
Until recently, evidence about domestic violence in cases where the
defendants were victims of abuse was frequently not allowed at trial. 26 In
those cases where evidence was presented, it was often raised ineffectively
to establish self-defense, or negated due to either the judges' or juries'
misapplication of the legal theory of self-defense with regard to battered
women's experiences. 
127
Historically, American jurisprudence has consistently disregarded the
rights of victims of abuse. 28 Since the law has widely permitted, even
codified, violence against women, judges and jurors often do not see it as a
life threatening concern. 29  Trial judges essentially have the power to
direct a verdict against a defendant by making decisions on the sufficiency
of defense evidence or in their jury instructions.130 Even if judges
recognize the severity of the abuse, the female defendant is often faulted
for taking the law into her own hands.' 31 Worse, the betrayal by law
enforcement is disregarded, as are mitigating factors in battered women's
cases. 132 For example, the clear lack of criminal histories in most of these
cases is ignored as are issues of duress or threat by an abuser if a battered
woman commits a crime. 133 Further, while there are laws that increase
sentences for egregious circumstances, such as when a defendant is a
125. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 25, at 145; see also Presidential
Pardons: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary (2001)
(statement of Daniel Kobil, Professor of Law, Capital University Law School), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/judiciary/kobil_022801.htm.
126. In People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d. 822, 824-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that expert witnesses may testify about the "battered spouse
syndrome" in support of a self-defense claim, but are limited to describing the syndrome,
and to explaining how the behavior of the defendant is characteristic of battered women
generally. For a discussion of the Michigan case, see Rodwan, supra note 76.
127. SCHNEIDER, Battered Women, supra note 25, at 113-21, 144-45. See generally
Buel, supra note 80.
128. Buel, supra note 80, at 328.
129. English common law and the case law in many states in the United States
recognized the right of men to control their wives through physical abuse until the late 19th
century. Caroline Dettmer, Increased Sentencing for Repeat Offenders of Domestic
Violence in Ohio: Will This End the Suffering?, 73 U. CrN. L. REV. 705, 709-10 (2004).
Michigan passed a law prohibiting marital rape only as recently as 1988. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.520 (effective June 1988).
130. Maguigan, supra note 36, at 439-40.
131. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 25, at 6.
132. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 11-12; SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note
25, at 229-32; Buel, supra note 80, at 224, 231.
133. Buel, supra note 80, at 234-35, 254-56, 265.
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habitual offender, or when a murder is committed in the course of the
commission of a felony, laws do not sufficiently reduce sentences in cases
involving special circumstances, such as those of battered women.
134
Compounding this crisis is the ineffective legal counsel representing
battered women in the courts. 135 As a result, national studies indicate that
between 75 percent and 82 percent of battered women charged with killing
their abusers are convicted or accept a guilty plea. 136 Maguigan's study
showed that jurors only understood the significance of the defendant's
evidence and the social context of a battered woman when a judge spelled
it out for them and instructed them to consider these issues. 137 In many
cases, women report being pressured by prosecutors and their own defense
attorneys to forgo a trial and plea bargain, even when they were wrongly
arrested.1
38
Higher conviction rates and longer sentences further add to the
injustice for victims of domestic violence who are convicted of murder.
The Michigan Parole Board's practice of denying parole to thousands of
eligible prisoners during the past decade, despite recommendations from
judges, police, the United Nations, and others, means that many of these
women received the equivalent of life without parole. 1
39
Clemency is an imperfect tool for dealing with women who killed their
abusers since many of the women should never have been prosecuted or
sentenced to prison in the first place. Commuting the sentence of a woman
who killed in self-defense does not change the systems that failed to protect
her, nor the courts that failed to provide a fair trial. However, since parole
boards refuse to consider these cases at all, or, at best, tend to reenact the
criminal trials and ignore the abuse, clemency is often the only available
tool to rectify the failures of the criminal justice system. 140
134. Buel, supra note 80 at 255.
135. See generally Buel, supra note 80.
136. Sue Osthoff, Making a Difference: Advocating Effectively for Women Who Kill,
PCADV NEWSL. (Pa. Coal. Against Domestic Violence, Harrisburg, Pa.), May 1990, at 2.
137. Maguigan, supra note 36, at 439.
138. Susan L. Miller, The Paradox of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence:
Criminal Justice Professionals and Service Providers Respond, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1339, 1360-63 (2001).
139. Only three battered women prisoners who killed their abusers and who were
represented by the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency Project have been released on
parole since the Project was founded in 1991. For two of these women, petitions filed by
the Clemency Project were sitting on the governor's desk at the time of parole, and,
according to the office of the legal counsel for the governor, provided support for their
parole. For the third woman, her parole followed a few months after her petition was
denied. Geraldean Gordon was paroled in 1998, after serving more than 13 years of an 18-
to 35-year sentence. Renee Adams was paroled in 2004, after serving 14 years of a 16- to
30-year sentence. Diane Howe was paroled in 2006, after serving 16 years of a 17- to 30-
year sentence. Since 1990, the average time served by an inmate sentenced to parolable life
was 19.1 years.
140. In 1992, Michigan Governor John Engler ordered an overhaul of the State
Parole Board and the way in which paroles were granted. The intent of the overhaul was to
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The actual number of women serving time for killing in self-defense
against a batterer is unknown. 14 1 Leonard estimates it may be as high as
4,500.142 According to the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of
Battered Women, at least 124 battered women from 23 states have received
clemency since 1978, most of them since 1990.143 In 1990, Governor
Richard F. Celeste of Ohio released 25 women. 144 In 1991, Governor
William Schaefer of Maryland released eight women, and between 1993
and 1994, Governor William Weld of Massachusetts released four.
145
Between 1993 and 1995, Governor Lawton Chiles of Florida commuted the
sentences of eight women. 46 From 1994 to 1997, Governor Jim Edgar of
Illinois granted clemency to seven women. 147 In 1996, on his last day in
office, Governor Brereton Jones of Kentucky commuted the sentences of
nine battered women. 48 In 1998, as he was leaving office, Governor Roy
Romer of Colorado commuted the sentences of four women. 149 Most, if
not all, of these commutations were prompted by the efforts of organized
clemency groups. 50 Their success depended on the willingness of
authorities to acknowledge and to act on the injustice despite the political
risk. 151  In some cases, governors such as Arnold Schwarzenegger of
California have helped to speed up the parole process for battered women
and/or signed bills to allow battered women inmates to challenge their
sentences. 152 Although clemency, commutations, and pardons have been
granted to battered women in a number of states, the majority continue to
serve long prison sentences. 1
53
VII. CASE STUDY
In one case from the present study, the defendant, Karen Kantzler, was
tried in 1988 and convicted of second-degree murder and felony firearm for
make Michigan's communities safer by making more criminals serve more time and
keeping many more locked up for as long as possible. MICH. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, FIVE
YEARS AFTER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN PAROLE BOARD SINCE 1992 at 2 (1997).
141. LEONARD, supra note 19, at 37.
142. Id.
143. NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, BATTERED
WOMEN WHO HAVE RECEIVED CLEMENCY (2002) (discussing how some governors or parole







150. GAGNE, supra note 57, at 158-67.
151. Id.
152. Jordan Rau, Battered Women's Law Okd, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2004, at B1;
Rose Aguilar, Abused Woman 's Freedom Could Herald New Era, BAY AREA BUSINESS
WOMAN, Oct. 2004, available at http://babwnews.com/article.php?id= 132.
153. LEONARD, supra note 19, at 28.
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the shooting death of her abusive husband, Paul Kantzler. 154  Karen
Kantzler met Paul during his internship as a medical student at Henry Ford
Hospital where Karen also worked as a radiology technician.' 55
Throughout their four-year marriage, Paul Kantzler used his physical
stature to exert brutal dominance and control over Karen. He was a large,
athletic man, measuring at six-foot-three and weighing approximately 250
pounds. 56 While a medical intern, Paul worked at nightclubs as a bouncer,
earned a black belt in karate and studied judo.157 Paul continued to work as
a bouncer and continued to box, even after becoming a medical doctor. "8
He owned guns: two handguns, four shotguns, and ten rifles. 59 Paul used
the guns on hunting trips and at the shooting range, and kept ammunition
all over the house. 160 When he was depressed, he often shot squirrels and
birds in the back yard.
161
Paul threatened to kill Karen on numerous occasions, and bragged
about beating up various people, some of whom were hospitalized for their
injuries. 62 Once, he openly bragged that he could kill all the people at a
party with his bare hands.' 63 In 1980, Paul was sued for severely beating
and injuring a man. 164 A family friend testified at Karen's trial that Paul's
father admitted to him that Paul was an aggressive child and that the father
believed Paul had a personality disorder. 165  At home, on one occasion,
Paul flew into a rage and threw Karen across the room. 66 After she hit a
piece of furniture upon landing, he grabbed her by the throat and sweater
and bashed her head against the floor. 167 On another occasion, he threw her
onto the concrete floor so hard she suffered bruises on her back and
buttocks and missed time from work. 68 Once, when Karen was struggling
to lift a garbage bin in the driveway, he attacked and beat her because she
seemed weak.1 69 At various times, he pointed guns at her; and at other
times, he held a switchblade to her, snapping it out to make her jump
154. Offender Tracking Information System, Offender Profile: Karen Ann Kantzler,
http://www.state.mi.us/mdoc/asp/otis2profile.asp?mdocNumber--192343 (last visited Oct.
22, 2006).
155. Transcript of Jury Trial at vol. 3, p. 168, vol. 5, pp. 26, 88, People v. Kantzler,
No. 87-78545-FC (Mich. 6th Jud. Cir. Ct. 1988).
156. Id. at vol. 2, pp. 170-71, vol. 3, pp. 117, 119, 172.
157. Id. at vol. 3, pp. 177, 181-83.
158. Id. at vol. 3, p. 183.
159. Id. at vol. 3, p. 53, vol. 5, p. 94.
160. Id. at vol. 3, pp. 4 9-5 1, 5 5.
161. Id. at vol. 5, p. 95 .
162. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 78, 96, 98.
163. Id. at vol. 4, pp. 49-50.
164. Id. at vol. 4, pp. 89-90.
165. Id. at vol. 4, p. 72.
166. Id. at vol. 5, p. 106.
167. Id.
168. Id. at vol. 5, p. 108.
169. Id.
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back.170 Karen suffered from a condition called Benign Femial Tremors, an
illness for which her husband would not allow her to receive medical
treatment.17  She also suffered two miscarriages during the marriage.
72
Karen sought help from many sources to no avail. Her doctors saw bruises
on her body on several occasions and noted that she was distraught and
depressed.1 73 Karen went to a divorce attorney, who also saw the bruises
and was concerned for Karen's safety. 174 However, since Karen had no
money of her own, she could not file for a divorce. 175 She asked her
husband to go to marriage counseling, but he refused to go and became
enraged. 76  She missed work at times because her face was red and
swollen, and because of other injuries. 177  She called Common Ground
Crisis Center in Birmingham for guidance at least twice.1 78 One call-report
reads in part:
Karen had called this afternoon (see attached write-up). She was
quite upset and cried frequently. She repeated what she had said in
the call this afternoon, also related physical abuse, also that this is
not the first time he has threatened to kill her, but this is different
because this time she thinks he might. And he would be well able
due to his size, skill and guns.
179
Although Karen considered obtaining an injunction to prevent the
physical abuse, she decided against it because Paul had warned her that if
she ever told anyone that he laid a hand on her, he would kill her.180 When
asked why she never called the police after a beating, she replied, "Because
I was afraid that Paul would kill me."' 81 Although she was married to a
doctor who earned more than $100,000 a year, Karen had no control over
or access to any money he earned. 182 He controlled all of their income and
assets. 83 He took the proceeds she had brought into the marriage from a
condominium, a car, and a pension from Henry Ford Hospital.
184
On March 11, 1987, Paul Kantzler was found dead at the family home
170. Transcript of Jury Trial, supra note 155, at vol. 5, p. 98.
171. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 6,9-12, 14, 16, 18.
172. Id. at vol. 5, p. 102.
173. Id. at vol. 6, p. 54.
174. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 32-33
175. Id. at vol. 5, p. 52.
176. Id. at vol. 5, p. 100.
177. Id at vol. 5, p. l10.
178. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 74, 78.
179. Id at vol. 5, p. 78.
180. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 101-02.
181. Id at vol. 5, p. 102.
182. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 24, 38-39.
183. Id. at vol. 5, p. 24.
184. Id. at vol. 3, p. 148, vol. 5, pp. 29, 74, 79, 91-92, vol. 6, p. 14.
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in West Bloomfield, Michigan, as a result of a gunshot wound to the left
side of his head, just behind his ear.185  As officers from the West
Bloomfield Police Department pulled up to the house, Karen was sobbing
at the front door.' 86 She initially told officers that her husband had shot
himself.'87
Earlier that evening, an argument had erupted between Paul and Karen
after they both had some drinks before and during dinner at a nearby
restaurant. 188 Paul consumed three glasses of vodka and three beers before
dinner and a carafe of wine at dinner. 189 At home, he told her she had
ruined his life because she couldn't have his children, that she was worth
nothing, and accused her of running up his charge cards. 190 About 20
minutes after he went to bed, he ordered her to come to bed.' 9' As she
entered the bedroom, she saw that he had a "funny" look on his face and
was holding a gun.' 92 He pulled her into the room and pushed her against
the closet doors.' 93 He held the gun to her neck and threatened to kill
her.194 She pushed him away as hard as she could, and as he fell backwards
she tried to get the gun. 195 They fought over it and Karen heard it go off.
19 6
She called a friend who came over and called the police.1
97
The prosecutor claimed that the murder was premeditated, that the
motive was a $100,000 life insurance policy, and that Karen feared her
husband was going to divorce her.' 98  She was tried and convicted of
second-degree murder. 199 The judge expressed sympathy for Karen, stating
that there was evidence of spousal abuse. 200  However, he did not
acknowledge the complete failure of the criminal justice system to protect
her, and instead revealed his bias toward a survivor of domestic violence:
Considering everything I have said, my sympathy and sympathy
for the family, for the victim and considering what I believe is
genuine remorse on your part, I must tell you that the proper option
185. Transcript of Jury Trial, supra note 155, at vol. 2, pp. 155, 163, 165-66, 188,
vol. 6, p. 14.
186. Id. at vol. 1, pp. 6, 49, vol. 2, pp. 7-9, 104-06, 134, 136, 141.
187. Id. at vol. 1, pp. 51, 56, 62, vol. 2, pp. 105, 136, vol. 3, p. 67, vol. 5, p. 140, vol.
6, pp. 33-34.
188. Idat vol. 2, pp. 112, 142, vol. 5, pp. 111, 113, 121,124, 128.
189. Id. at vol. 3, pp. 31, 123, vol. 4, pp. 22-23, 26, vol. 5, pp. 118, 121, 123-24.
190. Id. at vol. 5, p. 127.
191. Id. at vol. 5, p. 131.
192. Id. at vol. 5, p. 134.
193. Id.
194. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 134-35.
195. Id. at vol. 5, pp. 135-36.
196. Id. at vol. 5, p. 136.
197. Id. at vol. 3, pp. 201-02.
198. Id. at vol. 2, pp. 90-99.
199. Id. at vol. 7, p. 4 .
200. Id. at vol. 8, p. 18.
Winter 20071 THE CASE FOR CLEMENCY
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
in the situation that you found yourself in would have been to seek
a separation or a divorce.
20 1
Following her conviction for second-degree murder, and her 1988
sentence of life with the possibility of parole, Karen Kantzler filed a
Motion for Modification of Judgment of Sentence in 1993.202 Among other
things, she claimed that the sentence was invalid as Judge Norman L.
Lippitt had misunderstood its implications, and that the sentence was
disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense.20 3 Judge Lippitt
himself submitted an affidavit, acknowledging his error. 20 4 In his affidavit,
he states:
I continue to believe that Karen Kantzler was not well represented
at trial, and she was a victim of spouse abuse ... at the time of
sentence, I was not aware of statistics in the State of Michigan, but
have been subsequently informed, that in the year 1985, there was
only a total of 9 prisoners serving life sentences for crimes other
than first degree murder, or major controlled substance offenses,
who were released on parole, and that none of them were released
on parole prior to 20 years. Further, I have been informed that
during the same year there were between 700 and 1,000 inmates
serving similar life sentences who were not paroled within 20
years. 2
°5
Recognizing that the trial judge had imposed the sentence in error due
to a misunderstanding of the legal ramification of a life sentence and
implementation of the parole statutes and the changing Department of
Corrections policy regarding parole, the successor judge, Barry L. Howard,
modified Karen Kantzler's sentence from life to a term of years - 3 to 10
years - for second-degree murder, with credit for 1,028 days served.20 6
However, the prosecutor appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals
vacated the new sentence.20 7 Despite the fact that two trial court judges
heard the details of the crime, observed Ms. Kantzler, and decided that a
life sentence was not appropriate, the sentence was upheld.20 8
201. Transcript of Jury Trial, supra note 155, at vol. 8, pp. 18-19.
202. Transcript of Court's Opinion and Sentencing at 5-6, People v. Kantzler, No.
87-7878545-FC (Mich. 6th Cir. Ct. 1993).
203. Id..
204. Affidavit of Normal L. Lippitt at 1-2, People v. Kantzler, No. 87-78545-FC
(Mich. 6th Cir. Ct. 1993).
205. Id at 2.
206. Order for Modification of Judgment of Sentence, People v. Kantzler, No. 87-
78545-FC (Mich. 6th Cir. Ct. 1993).
207. People v. Kantzler, No. 168480 (Mich. Ct. App.), leave to appeal denied, 541
N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 1995).
208. Id.
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Both judges have written letters and/or affidavits in support of
clemency for Karen Kantzler.2 °9 In a December 15, 2003, letter to
Governor Granholm, supporting the second petition for Karen Kantzler
submitted by the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency Project, (former)
Judge Lippitt wrote:
Karen Kantzler was a battered woman. Her husband had a long
history of both physical and mental abuse directed toward her. I
sentenced her to life imprisonment for her conviction of second
degree murder. When I sentenced her, as supported by affidavits I
have already filed in the matter, I was under the mistaken
impression that she would be eligible for parole in 10 years. I later
learned that, as a practical matter, her parole after 10 years, or
anything close to 10 years, was not possible. That was a serious
and tragic error on my part. 2
Given that Karen Kantzler bears permanent and debilitating injuries
from the years of beatings at the hands of her husband, and that this was a
case of self-defense in a struggle over the batterer's gun, the most "tragic
error" was that she was prosecuted at all. The purposeful discrimination
against Karen Kantzler and an entire class of persons in the Oakland
County courts constitutes a deprivation of equal protection under the law,
excessive punishment, and denial of due process.211
Both the Michigan and the United States Constitutions grant to their
citizens the right to equal protection under the law and guarantees of
substantive due process.212 The statistics, however, show a "disparate
impact" of sentencing practices. In People v. Kantzler, the statistical
evidence, coupled with evidence of discrimination and admitted error by
the trial judge, establishes violations of equal protection and due process
laws as required in McCleskey v. Kemp. Nevertheless, a 2003 Motion for
Relief from Judgment filed by the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency
Project on behalf of Karen Kantzler was denied by presiding judge, John J.
McDonald.213 His Opinion states:
209. Letter from Normal L. Lippitt, Judge of the 6th Circuit of the State of Michigan,
to Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of the State of Michigan (Dec. 15, 2003) (on file with
author); Letter from Norman L. Lippitt, Judge of the 6th Circuit of the State of Michigan, to
John Engler, Governor of the State of Michigan (Sept. 9, 1996) (on file with author); Letter
from Barry L. Howard, Judge of the 6th Circuit of the State of Michigan, to Michigan
Parole Board (Nov. 22, 1995) (on file with author).
210. Letter from Normal L. Lippitt, Judge of the 6th Circuit of the State of Michigan,
to Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of the State of Michigan (Dec. 15, 2003) (on file with
author).
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 17.
212. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI & XIV; MICH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 17.
213. Opinion and Order at 5, People v. Kantzler, No. 87-78545-FC (Mich. 6th Cir.
Ct. 2003).
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While Defendant has listed several statistical facts in support of her
equal protection and due process argument, Defendant has not
demonstrated that, but for the alleged errors, the jury would have
rendered a different result.
2 14
On the statistical evidence of bias in conviction and sentencing in
Oakland County, the Court in Kantzler found "no jurisdictional defect., 215
Karen Kantzler remains in prison serving a life sentence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
No batterer acts alone. Violence against women is facilitated by
gender- and race-based inequalities in our social and political systems,
structures that perpetuate the denial of abuse, blaming women for batterers'
acts, and socio-economic barriers to women's independence.216 These
interlocking structures connect domestic violence to imprisonment through
unequal treatment by the law and gendered modes of punishment.2 17  Like
Karen Kantzler, Stacy Barker, and others in this study, as well as those in
the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency Project, many women should
not have been charged at all or should have succeeded with their claims of
self-defense at trial. For others, the punishment was far too severe, given
the circumstances of their cases. The consequences were also unjust to
their minor children who were placed in foster care or shuttled from
relative to relative. Courts, laws, and law enforcement have all been
unwilling to acknowledge that their failure to protect battered women
results in women being killed or being forced to kill.218 Instead, women are
214. Opinion and Order, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra, note 25, at 12.
217. Angela Y. Davis, Public Imprisonment and Private Violence: Reflections on the
Hidden Punishment of Women, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 339 (1998).
218. In the 26 cases represented by the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency
Project in court and/or through clemency petitions to the Governor since 1991, some
evidence of violence and abuse suffered by these women was presented in only seven cases.
In one of those cases, a judge told the woman she could not be a battered woman because
she held a job. In another, evidence of sexual abuse apparently did not register as battering
with the judge or jury. In a third, the judge acknowledged the abuse, but decided that the
killing was "premeditated" because the woman had time to protect her child by moving him
out of harm's way during her husband's rampage, before she shot him in defense of her
child and herself. In another case, a 19-year-old woman had been a virtual sex slave in her
home since she was brought to the United States on an arranged marriage. She spoke very
little English, yet the judge declared as he sentenced her in 2000, "Certainly everybody in
America is aware of womens [sic] group shelters and other places that they can go for
assistance when they believe they are being subjected to domestic violence, physical and
otherwise." In Karen Kantzler's case, the judge admonished her at sentencing for not
seeking a divorce, then admitted years later that he made a "serious and tragic error" in
sentencing her to life. Seven of the 26 women pled to second-degree murder, and all of
those except one received sentences at the top of, or over, the guidelines. Sixteen received
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told to take responsibility for their own abuse.
This study of Oakland County's homicide cases demonstrates that a
defendant charged with open murder during the late 1980s could expect to
be convicted 62 percent of the time and, if convicted, could expect to
receive a sentence of 10 to 15 years. Yet, for battered women, the
conviction rate jumped to 77 percent. For a white woman, like Karen
Kantzler, with no prior convictions who killed a white person, the
conviction rate was 97 percent and the predicted sentence increased to life.
For many battered women, a life sentence means dying in prison.21 9
The 1990s' legacy of political opportunism, get-tough-on-crime, and
the war on drugs produced a spending binge that bloated the prison
industry and increased sentencing practices out of all proportion in the
United States. Michigan's 2004 budget allotted the highest proportion
(20.1 percent) of its state general fund to corrections of any state in the
nation.220 Michigan and other states cannot afford, and justice will not be
served by, the continued imprisonment of women who act in self-defense
against abusers. 221 These women have been victimized not only by their
partners within the "privacy" of the nuclear family structure, but more
egregiously by a government that failed to protect them, overcharged them
when they protected themselves, refused their equal right to a fair trial and
sentencing, and finally, incarcerated them in a gendered system that has
denied them some of their most basic human rights. Clemency remains
their only hope for justice.
life. All but three were convicted before Michigan law changed to allow expert testimony
on battered women's experiences at trial.
219. Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2 2005, at 2. Since the founding of the Michigan Battered Women's Clemency
Project in 1991, three petitioners and several on the waiting list have died, including one
who committed suicide after serving over 25 years.
220. NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2004 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT
60 (2005), http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/2004ExpendReport.pdf.
221. Michigan spends more than $30,000 per year per prisoner at levels IV, V, and
VI. The release of 100 battered women could save the state approximately $3 million per
year. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2004),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/2004_AnnualReport_147719_7.pdf.
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